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Time is Money: Life Cycle Rational Inertia  
and Delegation of Investment Management 
 
1.  Introduction 
Most people devote sparse attention to their financial portfolios and do not actively manage 
their own finances.1 Individuals’ tendency to maintain their portfolio allocations for long periods 
of time, which we term investor inertia, has been interpreted by some as evidence of irrationality 
or financial illiteracy.2 Here, by contrast, we incorporate time costs associated with investment 
management and show that such inertia can be consistent with optimal behavior. Additionally, 
we explain why some investors rationally delegate the responsibility to make their investment 
decisions to a financial advisor.  
To this end, we develop a life cycle model with rational agents that can replicate 
empirically-observed household portfolio inertia patterns.3  In a dynamic consumption and 
portfolio framework with endogenous labor supply, we account for time costs devoted to 
portfolio management; this time becomes important when the investor must accumulate 
job-specific human capital via learning by doing. Our structure for financial decisionmaking 
costs posits an age-related time efficiency pattern for financial decisionmaking, in keeping with 
observed empirical evidence. We evaluate the role of financial advisors who, for a fee, help 
investors manage their financial portfolios. This possibility enables individuals to continue to 
invest in their job-related human capital. 
A long literature on household finance has focused on optimal dynamic portfolio 
allocation patterns by a rational forward-looking consumer who decides, on his own, how to 
                                                     
1 See for instance Abel, Eberly and Panageas (2013); Bilias, Georgarakos, and Haliasos (2009); Dellavigna and 
Pollet (2008); the Economist (2011); and Tang, Mitchell, Mottola and Utkus (2010). 
2 C.f., Bilias, Georgarakos, and Haliasos (2009); Lusardi and Mitchell (2014); and Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and 
Yamaguchi (2006). 
3 See Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008). 
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allocate his wealth between stocks and bonds.4 More recently, this approach has been extended 
to include flexible labor supply.5 The key contribution of the present paper, which builds on 
these prior studies, is that we develop and solve a life cycle model of consumption, labor supply, 
and portfolio management strategy, integrating the impact of time cost on investors’ portfolio 
choices in the context of endogenous human capital accumulation in a life cycle setting. This 
allows us to diagnose reasons for portfolio inertia and predict the age-related demand for 
delegation to financial advisors. 
We find that when investors cannot delegate, young investors exhibit inertia while 
middle-aged investors are more active. Since the young have little human capital but face the 
longest time horizon, their opportunity costs from financial investment are higher than those of 
middle-aged investors having more job-specific human capital. Retirees who must forgo leisure 
and are less efficient in decisionmaking are less likely to engage in self-management, particularly 
at older ages. In other words, different portfolio management approaches are selected optimally 
over the life cycle. We also find that the average portfolio allocation to equities is rather stable by 
age, at around 40-60%, consistent with empirical evidence.6 
In a world without access to a financial advisor, self-management is implemented mostly 
by middle-aged workers and early retirees; almost no young investors elect self-management. By 
contrast, the opportunity to delegate money management proves to be quite valuable for specific 
subgroups: about 10% of young investors, 15% of middle-aged investors, and 50% of older 
investors optimally turn over their management responsibilities to financial advisors. The 
                                                     
4 C.f. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005); Gomes and Michaelidis (2003); and Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and 
Stamos (2009). 
5 Among these are Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992); Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011); and Gomes, 
Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2008). 
6 See for example Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and U.S. Census Bureau (2012) 
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calibrated model shows that having a delegation option from the beginning of the lifetime boosts 
welfare by 2.5%, in terms of certainty equivalent consumption streams.  
In what follows, Section 2 describes the general specification of the investor’s portfolio 
problem when time is the primary cost of financial management. Section 3 explores when 
investors find it optimal to choose portfolio inertia, first when no delegation is feasible, and then 
we introduce the possibility of hiring a financial advisor. Section 4 presents a calibration and 
numerical solution of the model. Section 5 outlines results and provides measures of the welfare 
impact of delegation. We conclude with a discussion of implications of our findings for the 
financial advisory industry, retirement plan sponsors, and policymakers. 
 
2.  Dynamic Portfolio Choice with No Delegation 
2.1  Financial Decisionmaking Efficiency and Time Budgets over the Life Cycle 
 
This section specifies the investor’s problem when allocating his portfolio, assuming that 
asset self-management requires that he devote time to the process. Our model incorporates a 
dynamic consumer determining his equity share and labor supply, both of which influence his 
current and future labor income, and his financial wealth. The investor is endowed with an 
available time normalized to 1 each period, and he can allocate this time to work ሺ݈௧ሻ or leisure 
ሺܮ௧ሻ. Time ሺݐ ൌ 0, 1, … , ܶሻ is measured in years, assuming that at ݐ ൌ 0 the investor starts his 
work life at age 20. The investor also faces mortality risk over the course of his (uncertain) 
lifetime, and his maximum age is set to 100 (ܶ ൌ 80ሻ. 
When the individual is not a financial expert, investing his saving requires him to devote 
both time and mental resources to the task (Abel et al. 2013). This can be costly: for instance, 
managing financial assets requires locating and opening brokerage accounts, analyzing financial 
4 
 
products’ risk/return characteristics, and evaluating product fee structures. After deciding how to 
allocate his wealth between risk-free and risky assets, he must then devote time to implement 
these choices. For example, a buyer of mutual funds must read and compare many prospectuses 
and execute trading orders, and he may need to form a portfolio of various mutual funds to 
achieve his desired investment allocation. This imposes on him an opportunity cost, since his 
labor earnings depend on job-specific skills (i.e., human capital) accumulated mainly through 
work experience.7  
We capture the explicit opportunity cost of adjusting the wealth portfolio by the fraction of 
the investor’s time ሺ߶௧ሻ  devoted to financial decisionmaking. Someone who is not 
well-informed regarding financial management will need to allocate more time to acquire and 
process information related to portfolio management. Thus the investor faces the following time 
budget constraint: 
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߶௧૚ሼ௔೟ୀଵሽ ൌ 1,     (1) 
where ܽ௧ ൌ 1 is a variable taking the value of 1 if he self-manages, and 0 otherwise. We also 
posit that the time cost of making an efficient financial decision ߶௧ can vary with age, so that 
middle-aged consumers are more efficient in managing their wealth, compared to younger and 
older individuals. This is modeled as a U-shaped age-related function for the time cost of 
financial decisionmaking over the life cycle, as in Agarwal et al. (2009) who show that task 
performance skills (the sum of analytic and experiential skills) peak in middle age.8 Moreover, 
                                                     
7 Some people may enjoy self-management or believe they can outperform the market and professional investors. 
Yet few can do so in practice, and their performance is often worse than average (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; 
Mitchell et al. 2009). 
8 Technically, this inefficiency cost comes from the complexity that the typical investor faces when implementing 
his choices in a dynamic programming problem; see Johnson et al. (2001).  
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the investor incurs time costs every time he	self-manages his financial portfolio, since he must 
re-solve his life cycle model and implement new choices each period. 
2.2  The Human Capital Accumulation Process 
 We posit that job-specific human capital is accumulated through learning by doing, as in 
Arrow (1962) and Becker (1964). Here we denote as ܪ௧ and ݈௧, respectively, the time devoted 
to developing job-specific human capital and work time each period. The law of motion for 
job-specific human capital is: 
ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣ௧,     (2) 
where ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻ  is an experience formulation function and ߜ௧  is a depreciation rate9  for 
job-specific human capital. An idiosyncratic temporary shock (ߣ௧ሻ also affects the accumulation 
level of human capital in the next period. 
This formulation makes clear that work in the current period ሺ݈௧ሻ not only generates 
current labor income, but it also raises the stock of future human capital thus generating higher 
future labor income.10 Previous research on endogenous labor supply in a dynamic portfolio 
choice model incorporates wage income as an important source of risk (Bodie et al. 1992; Gomes 
et al. 2008; Chai et al. 2011), but there the decision to work is assumed to affect only current 
income. Consequently, those prior studies implicitly assume that work time substitutes for current 
leisure time, and the price of leisure is simply the current wage. By contrast, here we model the 
investor who considers how taking time away from work today influences his human capital 
accumulation, his future labor earnings, and his age-related efficiency pattern of financial 
decisionmaking.  
                                                     
9 This can also be interpreted as a rate of skill obsolescence; that is, some knowledge becomes outdated by the 
advent of new technology.  
10 This could also be interpreted as a reputation effect in the labor market.   
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We specify the experience acquisition function following Ben-Porath (1967), as follows:  
ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻ ൌ ܽሺܪ௧ ൉ ݈௧ሻఏ      (3) 
where a is a parameter that represents the individual efficiency or the learning ability for 
accumulating human capital.11 The elasticity of human capital accumulation ߠ is assumed to 
have decreasing returns to scale ൫ߠ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ൯. 
2.3  Labor Income and Asset Returns 
Labor income (ܧ௧) is determined by the individual’s job-specific human capital level 
ሺܪ௧ሻ and wage shock ሺ ௧ܻሻ: 
ܧ௧ ൌ ݈௧ܪ௧ ௧ܻ .    (4) 
Here ݈௧ represents (normalized) working hours. The pattern for human capital accumulation ܪ௧ 
is similar to the age-specific deterministic wage trend found in the life cycle literature (Cocco et 
al. 2005; Gomes et al. 2008). In the present model, however, ܪ௧ is endogenously accumulated 
over time by the individual’s labor supply. The wage shock ሺݕ௧ ≡ log ௧ܻሻ follows an AR(1) 
process and is influenced by an idiosyncratic shock ݕ௧ ൌ ߟ ൅ ߩݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߳௧௬ where 
߳௧௬~݅݅݀	ܰሺ0, ߪ௬ሻ. After the (exogenous) retirement age of 65 (ݐ ൌ 45ሻ, the individual enjoys full 
time leisure and receives a Social Security benefit equal to a fraction of his final labor earnings, 
similar to the US. retirement system. 
Two asset classes are available for the consumer’s investment portfolio: risky stocks and 
riskless bonds. The real stock return ሺܴ௧ሻ	is assumed to be serially independent and identically 
log normally distributed with parameters ߤௌ and ߪௌ, i.e. log ܴ௧ ~	ܰ	ሺߤௌ, ߪௌሻ.12 The stock log 
return and wage shock are correlated with a coefficient of ߪఢௌ. The riskless bond has a return തܴ 
                                                     
11 Our notion of human capital is informed by job-specific skills accumulated by working, as in Becker (1964). 
12 Tang et al. (2010) report that people receive lower returns when they manage their own portfolios, compared to 
having professionals manage them. For simplicity, we assume that equity returns are the same for all portfolio 
management methods (inertia, self-management, and delegation). 
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in all periods. We denote ܴ௧ାଵ as the stock return from ݐ to ݐ ൅ 1, so that the fraction of the 
individual’s wealth invested in stocks is determined in period ݐ, and returns are realized in ݐ ൅
1. 
2.4  Portfolio Choice and Wealth Dynamics 
At time t, the individual selects the equity portion ሺߨ௧ሻ for his portfolio, and the portfolio 
then generates an uncertain return of: ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߨ௧ሻܴ ൅ ߨ௧ܴ௧ାଵ. We note that ܴ௧ାଵ௉  is a 
random variable at time ݐ when the portfolio weight is selected and is realized at time ݐ	 ൅ 1. 
Denoting ܥ௧ as consumption, the dynamic budget constraint can be formulated as:13  
  ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ െ ܥ௧ሻ      (5) 
Total cash-on-hand in period ݐ consists of financial wealth ሺ ௧ܹሻ and labor income ሺܧ௧ ≡
݈௧ܪ௧ ௧ܻሻ. After consuming ܥ௧ in period ݐ, the consumer invests his remaining assets and earns 
returns of ܴ௧௉. 
2.5  Preferences and Time Horizon 
 As in Gomes et al. (2008), we suppose the investor has a standard time-separable, 
modified Cobb-Douglas power utility function over current consumption ሺܥ௧ሻ and time devoted 
to leisure ሺܮ௧ሻ in each period, given by ௧ܷሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൌ ଵଵିఊ ሺܥ௧ܮ௧ఈሻଵିఊ . Here ߙ	 ൐ 	0 captures an 
investor’s preference for leisure relative to consumption. The parameter ߛ  measures risk 
aversion. 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 We could introduce a direct transaction cost ሺܶܥሺߨ௧, ߨ௧ାଵሻሻ for portfolio adjustment in which case the wealth 
dynamics would be ௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ െ ܶܥሺߨ௧, ߨ௧ାଵሻ૚ሼ௔ௗ௝௨௦௧௠௘௡௧ሽ െ ܥ௧ሻ. Nevertheless, we do not focus here 
on direct monetary costs; see Bonaparte and Cooper (2009) for a discussion.  
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3  Dynamic Portfolio Choice Problem with Inertia, Self-Management, and Delegation 
3.1  Portfolio Inertia 
Technically speaking, portfolio inertia in period ݐ is defined as retaining the previous 
period’s portfolio in the next period while incurring no time cost. When an investor continues to 
follow his previous period’s portfolio allocation ሺߨ௧ሻ next period (ߨ௧ାଵሻ, he saves time	ሺ߮௧ሻ 
that he would otherwise devote to collecting and analyzing new information to rebuild an optimal 
financial portfolio and implement the change. For this reason, when the investor engages in 
portfolio inertia, his next period portfolio share is identical to that he set previously, so his time 
constraint is not impacted by the cost of financial decisionmaking. Accordingly, someone 
electing portfolio inertia has the following equity share and time constraint (where ݈௧ and ܮ௧ 
denote labor supply and leisure, respectively): 
ߨ௧ାଵ ൌ ߨ௧  
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ 1 
It is worth emphasizing that holding the same portfolio over time does not necessarily 
imply that the investor is engaging in portfolio inertia. That is, he could decide to incur the time 
cost to self-manage and still end up selecting his previous portfolio	as the optimum for next 
period. In this event, his portfolio choice is not naïve, and he will sacrifice a portion	ሺ߮௧ሻ of his 
available time to end up in this position.  
Portfolio inertia permits a previous period’s portfolio choice to affect the current period’s 
decision regarding which portfolio management method to use. Thus the previous portfolio ሺߨ௧ሻ	 
serves as a state variable in our model. Other state variables include wealth ሺ ௧ܹሻ, accumulated 
human capital level ሺܪ௧ሻ	, and the wage shock ሺݕ௧ሻ. In total, then, we have four choice 
9 
 
variables: the portfolio management method (i.e., portfolio inertia or self-management), labor 
supply	ሺ݈௧ሻ, the next period’s equity share ሺߨ௧ሻ, and consumption ሺܥ௧ሻ.  
We define ௧ܸ௔ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ as the discounted lifetime utility of an investor when he 
chooses to self-manage his portfolio. Similarly, ௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ  denotes the discounted 
lifetime utility of an investor when he chooses portfolio inertia. Then the value function at time t 
may be specified as: 
 ௧ܸሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ≡ ݉ܽݔ൛ ௧ܸ௔ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ, ௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻൟ.   (6)  
Let ߚ ൏ 1 be the investor’s time preference and ݌௧ the probability that he survives to the next 
period. Then the value function for self-management method is as follows: 
௧ܸ௔ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ maxሼ஼೟,గ೟,௟೟	ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ 
ݏ. ݐ. ܥ௧ ൑ 	 ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ െ ܥ௧ሻ      (7) 
ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣݐ 
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߶௧ ൌ 1. 
The value function for the individual electing portfolio inertia is: 
௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ maxሼ஼೟,௟೟	ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ 
ݏ. ݐ. ܥ௧ ൑ 	 ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ െ ܥ௧ሻ      (8) 
ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣݐ 
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ 1. 
When an investor employs portfolio inertia, he does not maximize the value function with 
respect to equity share but instead takes the previous equity share as his next period’s portfolio. 
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That is, if ௧ܸ௔ ൒ ௧ܸ௜, the investor opts for self-management ሺܽ௧ୀଵሻ; else he opts for portfolio 
inertia.  
The key differences between the two value functions have to do with the time constraint 
and the next period’s portfolio choice. The appeal of portfolio inertia is that the time saved can 
then be used to work and accumulate more human capital, or to enjoy more leisure. During 
retirement the investor does not work, so if he decides to self-manage his portfolio he sacrifices 
only his leisure time. Nevertheless, increasing inefficiency in financial decisionmaking makes 
inertia appealing at older ages.14 
3.2  The Role of Financial Advisors 
Next we extend our model to examine how introducing financial advisors can add value 
to life cycle decisionmakers.15 Reasons for delegating portfolio management can include time 
costs, efficiency gains due to lower transaction costs, and beliefs regarding professional 
managers’ skills. In what follows, we focus mainly on the investor’s loss of human capital 
associated with having to manage his own portfolio.  
When an investor elects to delegate the portfolio management to an advisor, he must pay 
a management fee out of his total cash-on-hand ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ሻ. The advantage of hiring the financial 
advisor is the saved time which can then be used to work and accumulate more job-specific 
knowledge, or to enjoy leisure. If, instead, he self-manages his portfolio, he need not pay the 
adviser fee but he does incur the time cost associated with his age-based efficiency pattern of 
financial decisionmaking. In the financial advisory service industry, the fee generally consists of 
a fixed minimum dollar amount ሺ߮௠௜௡ሻ and a variable component ሺ߮௣௧௚ሻ, where the latter is 
                                                     
14 Sufficient conditions for the selection of portfolio inertia are provided in Appendix A. 
15 In the U.S., Registered Investment Advisors (RIAs) must file with the Securities and Exchange Commission so 
they can advise on financial investments including stocks, bond, mutual funds, etc. They also manage portfolios of 
securities for households and employers, helping implement clients’ optimal portfolio choices. See Mitchell and 
Smetters (2013). 
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expressed as percentage of assets under management. Formally, this structure may be expressed 
as follows:  
߮௧ ൌ max	ሺ߮௠௜௡, ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ሻ ∗ ߮௣௧௚ሻ	    (9) 
The financial advisor not only chooses a portfolio for the consumer but also proposes the optimal 
levels of consumption and labor supply. The value function for the delegated portfolio 
management method is: 
ܸ݀ݐ ൫ܹݐ, ܪݐ, ߨݐ, ݕݐ൯ ൌ maxሼ௖೟,గ೟,௟೟	ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ݌௧ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ 
ݏ. ݐ.		ܥ௧ ൑ 	 ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ െ ߮௧ 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ െ ߮௧ െ ܥ௧ሻ     (10) 
ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߨ௧ሻ തܴ ൅ ߨ௧ܴ௧ାଵ 
ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣݐ 
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ 1 
Note that the investor does pay the management fee ߮௧ out of his cash on hand, but he does not 
incur the time cost ߶௧. 
One important issue when delegating portfolio management is the possibility of a conflict 
of interest between the investor seeking to maximize his utility over consumption and leisure, and 
the financial advisor who seeks to maximize the client’s wealth (and thereby his own fees).16 
Such moral hazard is mitigated in a dynamic setting since the financial advisor must take into 
                                                     
16 The conflict of interest between clients and financial advisors has been analyzed theoretically by Sharpe (1985), 
Stoughton et al. (2011), and Mullainathan et al. (2012), among others. Even though the investor cannot observe the 
financial advisor’s portfolio choice at the beginning of time t, he can easily obtain information about the past return 
process and his total wealth at the end of time ݐ ൌ 1,… , ܶ. In a competitive market, each advisor will be monitored 
by his competitors which implies that reputation costs will reduce his chances of being hired by some other investor. 
Ou-Yang (2003) examines a continuous-time dynamic optimization problem in a delegated portfolio management 
problem, where he finds that a financial advisor exactly follows the investor’s optimal portfolio policy if a symmetric 
(i.e., reward and punishment) remuneration scheme is offered. For this reason, the investor need not consider the 
incentive compatibility problem.  
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account his reputation and potential future revenue, which naturally depend on client outcomes. 
Accordingly, for the investor to implement his first-best choice, he must be able to verify the 
advisor’s choices, which in our model is possible since we assume the return process is observed 
ex-post. Accordingly, we only need to solve the investor’s dynamic programming problem; his 
optimal choices will be implemented by his financial advisor so the problem can be summarized 
as:  
 ௧ܸሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ 
ൌ maxሼ௔೟,௟೟,గ೟శభ,௖೟	ሽ ௧ܷ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ	
ݏ. ݐ.		ܥ௧ ൑ 	 ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ܧ௧ െ ૚ሼ௔೟సమሽ߮௧ െ ܥ௧ሻ 
ܴ௧௣ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߨ௧ሻ തܴ ൅ ߨ௧ܴ௧      (11) 
ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሾሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻሿ ൈ ߣݐ 
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߮௧૚ሼ௔೟సభሽ ൌ 1 
ߨ௧ାଵ ൌ ߨ௧	݂݅	ܽ௧ ൌ 0	 
where ܽ௧ ൌ 0	 denotes portfolio inertia, ܽ௧ ൌ 1	self-management, and ܽ௧ ൌ 2	hiring a financial 
advisor. In addition, ௧ܸ ≡ ൛ ௧ܸ௜, ௧ܸ௔, ௧ܸௗൟ where ௧ܸ௜ is the value function for the portfolio inertia 
case, ௧ܸ௔ is the value function for self-management, and ௧ܸௗ is the value function for delegating 
portfolio management. 
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4  Model Calibration and Solution 
4.1  Existence of a Solution and Numerical Procedure 
There is no simple Euler equation linking the marginal benefit of today’s portfolio 
adjustment with future marginal benefits, inasmuch as the investor is unsure about which 
portfolio management method he will select in the future (Adda and Cooper 2003). Although the 
existence of solutions is guaranteed (see Appendix B), deriving these is analytically intractable. 
For this reason we solve the model numerically via backward induction, polynomial 
approximation of the value function, and Monte-Carlo integration. 
4.2  Parameter Calibration  
To characterize the model’s output, we calibrate the model using a reasonable set of base 
case parameters. We set the discounting factor ߚ to 0.98, the coefficient of risk aversion at 
ߛ	 ൌ 	3, and the leisure preference to ߙ	 ൌ 	1.3, as is conventional. The one-period survival rates 
݌௧ which enter into the utility function are calculated by the cohort mortality table from the 2009 
US Social Security Administration Trustees Report for females born in 1990 (Bell and Miller 
2012). 
To calibrate human capital accumulation process we assume that human capital ܪ௧ 
depreciates at rate of ߜ௧ ൌ 0.07% ൈ ܽ݃݁ per year, the elasticity parameter in the experience 
accumulation function is set to ߠ ൌ 0.2954, and the accumulation rate to ܽ ൌ 0.2192. The 
idiosyncratic shocks of human capital development follow an independent identically lognormal 
distribution ݈݊ሺߣݐሻ~ܰሺെ0.5·0.2917ଶ, 0.2917ሻ. These parameters produce a similar age-dependent 
wage rate profile as used in Gomes et al. (2008).17 For the permanent wage shock process ݕ௧, 
                                                     
17 Technically, we numerically minimize the distance of various moments (i.e., mean, standard deviation, median, 
skewness, kurtois, max, min and the age of maximum wage) of the simulated human capital accumulation process 
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the drift parameter η is set to zero, the AR(1) autocorrelation coefficient to 0.85, and the wage 
shock standard deviation is 0.2917 prior to retirement, and afterwards it is 0.28 (as in Love 2010). 
After retirement, when labor supply is zero, shocks may be interpreted as income or consumption 
surprises typical of those experienced by older households (e.g. unexpected out-of-pocket 
medical expenses or long-term care expenses).  
Retirement benefits replace about 50% of the individual’s last labor income ܧ௧ ൌ 0.2ܪସହ ସܻହ 
(ݐ ൌ 45, 46,… , ܶሻ. This formulation generates higher (lower) replacement rates for worker with 
lower (higher) average career earnings, consistent with the progressive benefit rules of the U.S. 
Social Security system (Chai et al. 2011). The riskless asset return തܴ is set to 1.02 and the risk 
premium for stocks is 4% with a standard deviation of 20,5% (Cocco et al. 2005). In our baseline 
calibration, the fixed minimum management fee ߮௠௜௡ to delegate portfolio management to an 
advisor is set to zero.18 The variable portfolio management fee ߮௣௧௚ is set to 1.3%, which is the 
median expense ratio for U.S equity mutual funds (ICI 2013).19  
The efficiency function for financial decisionmaking is assumed to be convex (Agarwal et 
al. 2009). Investors around age 50 are assumed to be most financially savvy with ߶ଶଶ ൌ 0.03; 
that is, they must sacrifice only 3% of their normalized time to manage their own portfolios. 
Young investors are assumed to be the least efficient (߶ଵ ൌ 0.09). The functional form for 
efficiency is assumed to be as follows: ߶௧ ൌ ଴.଴ଽି଴.଴ଷଷ଴ర ሺܽ݃݁ െ 30ሻସ ൅ 0.03, where the 4th power 
generates a flatter efficiency pattern for the middle-aged. Although we have no direct empirical 
evidence for this functional form and the selected parameters, we believe that this is a reasonable 
calibration which allows us to explore how the efficiency patterns affect portfolio management 
                                                                                                                                                                            
given in equations (2) and (3) relative to the (determinitic) age-dependent wage profile used in Gomes et al. (2008). 
In this procedure we assume a fixed level (݈௧ ൌ 0.5ሻ of labor supply until retirement. 
18 Even though financial advisors can play somewhat different roles from that of a mutual fund portfolio manager, 
their fee levels are similar. 
19 To be precise we set, to avoid numerical problems, ߮௣௧௚ equal to 0.0001% of the first year’s maximum wage. 
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schemes. In sensitivity analysis below, we also report results using different inefficiency patterns 
by age. Baseline parameters are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 here 
 
5. Simulated Life Cycle Profiles  
We describe investor behavior using the optimal controls of the baseline parameterization 
of our life cycle model to generate 2,000 simulated lifetimes reflecting realizations of stock 
returns and labor income shocks. We summarize results for portfolio management methods 
(inertia, self-management, delegation), and the allocation to risky stocks over the life cycle. 
Average life cycle profiles of choice variables when delegation is not an option are 
presented in Figure 1. Panel A shows that the model generates consumption and wealth profiles 
over the life cycle consistent with other studies, namely hump-shaped with age (e.g. Gomes et al. 
2008). Panel B refers to labor earnings and pension benefits; these payments rises with age due to 
human capital accumulation and then drop sharply at retirement. Panel C reveals that investors’ 
average equity share pattern is relatively flat with age, ranging between 40 and 60%, consistent 
with empirical evidence (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). Panel D traces the level of labor supply 
which is relatively flat over time, and the stock of human capital which rises with age until 
retirement. 
Figure 1 here 
In Figure 2 we trace the pattern of portfolio management methods (inertia versus 
self-management) over the life cycle (Panel A), and the equity share conditional for the subgroup 
of those electing each method (Panel B). Inertia proves to be the dominant method for young 
investors up to about age 30; thereafter self-management rises steadily to retirement and many 
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retirees switch to self-management. The explanation is that the young have little wealth but much 
to lose if they devote time to manage their meager assets; at older ages, individuals have more 
wealth and a lower opportunity cost of time. Moreover, portfolio inertia plays an important role 
in generating the flat equity share pattern. That is, the young investors begin with a low equity 
share and select portfolio inertia. The middle-aged are more active, since this group is the most 
efficient in terms of financial decisionmaking and they have already accumulated substantial 
human capital. For this reason, sacrificing a small amount of time has only a modest impact on 
their future wage rates. Still, however, almost 85% of the middle-aged group does not change 
portfolio allocations; such a high level of inactivity is consistent with several empirical studies 
(Mitchell et al. 2006; Vissing-Jorgensen 2003). Among the older group, their lower 
decisionmaking efficiency somewhat depresses their interest in self-management, though they are 
still more active than young investors. And interestingly, retirees are much more likely to switch 
to self-management due to having more leisure time; in fact, the fraction of self-managing 
investors jumps from 15% at age 64 to about 30% at age 65. At very old ages, investors are quite 
inefficient in financial decisionmaking, needing ever-larger fractions of their time when they 
self-manage their assets. This discourages self-management. 
Figure 2 here 
Next, Panel B of Figure 2 shows the average equity share for the two different subgroups. 
Here we see, that compared to inertia investors, those who chose self-management allocate a 
much higher fraction of their financial assets to stocks: on average, self-managing investors hold 
90% of their financial assets in stocks during their work lives. Interestingly, active investors 
sharply curtail their equity exposure at retirement from 90% to 70%. A detailed look into 
individual simulated life cycle profiles reveals that active investors typically have more wealth 
than do the inertia investors. Thus wealthier investors allocate more time, i.e. become active, to 
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improve the risk and return profile of their financial assets. It is well known (c.f., Bodie et al. 
1992) that in a world with flexible labor supply, investors should hold much of their wealth in 
risky stocks, even when wage rates are uncertain. The reason is that flexible work hours serve as 
insurance against negative shocks in the financial market.  
Nevertheless, after retirement (here, mandatory at age 65), the insurance-like feature of 
flexible work is eliminated. Moreover, older households still face substantial income uncertainty. 
Both factors reduce the investor’s willingness to take financial risk. Accordingly, a rational 
response for wealthy and active investors is to reduce their equity share post-retirement. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics concerning the dynamics of portfolio management 
methods when no delegation option is feasible. On average, investors change their portfolio 
management approaches 6.58 times during their lifetimes, and they elect inertia for 66.44 years 
overall. Years of portfolio self-management average 13.56, and the first year when people elect 
self-management is about 30.87 years after entering the labor force. About 6.8% of people 
(=1-[1864/2000]) never choose self-management and remain inactive over their lifetimes.  
Table 2 here 
Figure 3 shows what happens when investors can delegate their investment management to 
a financial advisor. Panel A illustrates the pattern of portfolio inertia, self-management, and 
delegation by age, while Panel B shows the equity share for each subgroup. Overall, we see that 
access to delegation reduces inertia and self-management compared to Figure 2, and delegation 
grows more attractive with age. Approximately 15% of young investors (up to age 30), 10% of 
middle-aged investors (age 30-65), and 25%-50% of retired investors now optimally delegate to 
financial advisors. Self-management is adopted by only a small fraction (under 1%) of the 
younger investors, but many more middle-aged (around 10%) and older investors (around 15%) 
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do so. And access to delegation substantially reduces inertia, especially among the very young 
and oldest investors.   
Figure 3 here 
Next we compare equity investment profiles in Panel B of Figures 2 and 3. Compared to 
the no-delegation world, people who elect inertia or self-management ramp up their equity 
holdings younger and hold more equity until retirement. Our analysis of the various portfolio 
management methods (Table 3) shows that investors facing favorable stock market experience 
and adverse labor market shock are more likely to become active rather than inertia investors. 
When the delegation option is available, only investors with very favorable stock market and 
extremely adverse labor market shock will still elect to self-manage their portfolios, but they will 
invest more in equity because of favorable stock market returns. So equity share for active 
investors may be higher when a delegation option is available.  
Table 3 here 
When a delegation option is available, the higher equity share of inertia investors can be 
attributed to the financial advisors. That is, some investors who hire financial advisors early in 
life end up with relatively high equity shares, consistent with the normative implications of a life 
cycle model with flexible work supply (see Bodie et al. 1992). Later in life, they might retain 
these portfolios and become inactive, because sticking with the higher equity share produces an 
outcome sufficiently close to their optimal equity share. By contrast, those who continue to hire 
financial advisors until reaching retirement have intermediate equity holdings compared to the 
other two groups.  
In retirement, the investors in the inertia subgroup hold a relatively constant equity share, 
while the other two groups curtail their equity holdings. In particular, self-managers reduce their 
equity holdings substantially. As is true with no delegation, the sharp decline of active-investors' 
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equity investment post-retirement can be explained by the loss of the insurance-like feature of 
flexible work hours to compensate for negative stock market shocks.  
Table 3 also shows some of the dynamics of portfolio management methods when a 
financial advisor is available. On average, investors now change their portfolio management 
approach much more often, 15.15 times over their lives (versus 6.58 in Figure 2), and they elect 
inertia for a shorter period (56.55 years, versus 66.44 in Figure 2). Of most interest is the fact that 
people devote less than half as many years to portfolio self-management (5.81 versus 13.56 
previously), and they engage advisors for more than a fourth of their adult lives (=17.84 
years/80). Investors begin to delegate relatively soon, after only 12.46 years from starting work 
and virtually all elect to delegate at some point (99%=1988/2000). By contrast, when delegation 
is an option, fewer self-manage and those who do, begin much later, 45.77 years after starting 
work (versus 30.87 in Figure 2). 
Table 4 summarizes changes by age when a delegation option becomes available, in 
patterns of wealth, equity share, labor income, labor supply, human capital, and consumption. All 
are expressed as a percent of the no-adviser base case. Here we see that having access to an 
advisor boosts wealth more than 20% across all age groups. This is due to the higher equity share 
noted above, and also the greater time devoted to work and human capital accumulation early in 
the career. Having access to an advisor also increases leisure in later life, and while consumption 
declines a bit early on, it increases rises by more than 2% after age 50 and into retirement.  
Table 4 here 
Next we summarize the factors associated with choice of portfolio management method in 
our simulated data using descriptive Logit regressions. Table 5 reports estimated marginal effects 
of lagged wealth, stock market shocks, and wage shocks when no delegation is permitted. Table 6 
conducts a similar analysis when financial advisors are available. The first analysis implies that 
20 
 
wealthier investors are less likely to engage in inertia, possibly because sticking to a non-optimal 
level of equity exposure can be more expensive for them than for the less wealthy. We also see 
that investors experiencing negative stock market shocks and positive wage shocks are more 
likely to elect portfolio inertia, due to the need to invest more in human capital and avoid riskier 
equity. Results are similar across model specifications. 
Tables 5 and 6 here   
Table 6 presents a similar descriptive Logit analysis but this time, investors can elect 
inertia, self-management, or delegation. Panel A uses self-management as the reference group, 
while Panel B uses inertia as the reference. As before, the wealthier are less likely to engage in 
inertia, but now wealthier people are also more likely to delegate. Negative stock market shocks 
deter both inertia and delegation, and positive wage shocks boost inertia while deterring 
delegation. Those who elect delegation over self-management tend to have more financial assets 
but experience negative labor income shocks. This is sensible since, for this subgroup, devoting 
time to financial management does not come at a high opportunity cost in terms of foregone labor 
earnings, and it helps increase their wealth. Additionally, wealthier people with unfavorable stock 
market shocks prefer delegation over inertia, consistent with the important link between labor 
income and portfolio management methods. When an investor faces a positive financial market 
as well as high wages, he opts for ways to obtain his optimal portfolio without sacrificing the 
chance to work and learn by doing.   
Finally, Figure 4 depicts the increase in lifetime welfare from having access to financial 
advisors, versus not having that option. As is conventional, we measure this in terms of a 
certainty equivalent (CE) consumption stream, or the stream of consumption that would afford 
the investor the same level of expected lifetime utility if he lacks access to the delegation option, 
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versus having it.20 The Figure shows that providing young investors with access to a financial 
advisor boosts lifetime welfare substantially, by the equivalent of a 2.5% enhancement in the 
annual consumption stream.21 This is similar in magnitude to that reported in Cocco et al. 
(2005), comparing welfare in a world with a fixed versus flexible equity share in the portfolio. It 
is also worth noting that welfare increases trace out a U-shaped profile with age. In other words, 
younger and older investors benefit most from having access to a financial advisor. This can be 
explained by the fact that the young do better by investing in their human capital instead of 
managing their money; the older group does better with advisors due to their declining efficiency 
of financial decisionmaking. 
Figure 4 here 
 Figure 4 also reports the results from sensitivity analysis, where we now assume that 
investors are even less efficient in decisionmaking than in the baseline calibration, across all age 
groups. The most financially savvy middle-aged investors are assumed to spend only 5% (߶ଶଶሻ 
of their available time, while young investors are assumed to sacrifice 12% (߶ଵ) of their available 
time if they invest actively. Not surprisingly, the welfare gains of having a delegation option 
increases, especially for young and old investors. Having the option to hire financial advisors is 
more valuable, the more costly is portfolio self-management.  
 
                                                     
20 As in Chai et al. (2011), the certainty equivalent constant consumption stream ሺܿ஼ாሻ is defined as:  
௧ܸሺ ଵܹ, ܪଵ, ߨଵ, ݕଵሻ ൌ ܧ ቂ∑ ߚ௜ ଵଵିఊ ሺܥ௜ሺܮ௜ሻఈሻଵିఊ	௜்ୀ௧ିଵ ቃ ൌ 	∑ ߚ௜௜்ୀ௧ିଵ
ଵ
ଵିఊ ሺܥ஼ா௧ ሺܮ∗ሻఈሻଵିఊ  
where ܮ∗  is a fixed level of leisure and ሺ ଵܹ, ܪଵ, ߨଵ, ݕଵሻ  is the initial pair of state. With some algebraic 
manipulation, we get: 
ܿ஼ா௧ ൌ ቈ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ௧ܸ∑ ሺܮ∗ఈሻଵିఊߚଵ௜்ୀ௧ିଵ ቉
ଵ
ଵିఊ
 
In calculating this measure, we set leisure ܮ∗ as time deducted from mean labor hours over 40 working years, due to 
retirement thereafter.  
21 It is noteworthy that the welfare gains introduced may be larger than measured here, if a financial advisor can 
provide the investor with access to lower transaction costs and possibly excess returns. 
22 
 
6  Conclusions 
This paper develops and simulates a life cycle model to illustrate optimal portfolio 
management methods selected by finitely-lived investors who face portfolio management costs 
and an age-dependent inefficiency pattern for financial decisionmaking. Using a reasonable set of 
parameters, our model replicates observed patterns of portfolio inertia across age groups. 
Investors who can accumulate job-specific knowledge by working tend to devote less time to 
managing their money when they are young. Middle-aged both have more assets to invest and 
suffer less from the opportunity costs of self-managing their assets, though many still elect 
inertia. Declining decisionmaking efficiency later in life prompts many older investors to select 
portfolio inertia. When investors can delegate the portfolio management task to a financial 
advisor, this enables many to avoid portfolio inertia. In general, the model predicts that older 
investors will find financial advisors most attractive. Finally, we find rather substantial welfare 
gains resulting from having a delegation option.   
Our findings are relevant to a variety of stakeholders including individual investors, 
financial advisors, retirement plan sponsors, and policymakers. Those who will value financial 
advisory services the most are the young and the older age groups, so making such services 
available can greatly enhance their well-being. Also of interest is the prediction that advisors will 
find that some middle-aged clients will wish to continue self-managing their own financial assets, 
even when a delegation option is available. Policymakers may also wish to consider the potential 
positive welfare gains of improving investor access to financial advisory services. In an 
environment where financial advisors with fiduciary responsibility can help investors manage 
their financial wealth optimally, this will enable more people to accrue job-specific skills, thus 
contributing to the economy as a whole. 
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Table 1: Parameter Values for Numerical Solution 
 Parameter Baseline 
 Working periods 45 
 Retirement periods  35 
 Time discounting β 0.98 
 Risk aversion γ 3 
 Leisure preference α 1.3 
 Experience formulation a 0.2192 
 Elasticity of ܪ௧ accumulation ߠ 0.2954 
 Depreciation of Human Capital ߜ௧ 0.07% × age per annum 
 Inefficiency of financial decisionmaking ϕ௧  ଴.଴ଽି଴.଴ଷଷ଴ర ሺ ݐ െ 30ሻସ+0.03 
 Wage shock drift η 0 
 Wage shock auto correlation ρ 0.85 
 Std. of permanent wage shock ߪ௪௔௚௘ (pre-retirement) 0.2917 
 Std. of permanent earnings shock (post-retirement) 0.28 
 Replacement rate 20% of maximum earnings at age 65 
 Risk premium 0.04 
 Std. of stock return ߪ௦௧௢௖௞ 0.205 
 Risk free rate ܴ 1.02 
 Delegation annual fee: variable rate ߮௧ 1.3% per annum 
 Delegation annual fee: fixed fee 0 
 Correlation between wage and stock return ߩఌ,఍  0.15 
 Initial wealth for simulation ଴ܹ 0 
 Initial human capital for simulation ܪ଴ 10 
 Initial equity share for simulation π0 40% 
 Initial wage shock for simulation ݕ଴ 0.1 
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Table 2: Dynamics of Portfolio Management over the Life Cycle with no Delegation Option 
 
 Mean Std Median  5%-Q 95%-Q N 
No. of switches 6.58 4.41 6 0 14 2000 
Years of inertia 66.44 12.90 70.00 37.00 80.00 2000 
Years of self-mgmt 13.56 12.90 10.00 0.00 43.00 2000 
First year of self-mgmt 30.87 20.20 28 6 66 1864 
Notes: No. of switches refers to the number of times someone alters his portfolio management method (from 
self-managed to inertia or vice versa) over the life cycle (from age 20 to age 100), conditional on survival. Years of 
inertia refers to the total length of the inertia period for specific simulated life cycle paths; and years of self-mgmt 
refers to the total length of the self-management period over specific simulated life cycle paths. First year of 
self-mgmt refers to the first year when the individual changes the portfolio management method from inertia to self- 
management. 
   
       
 
Table 3: Dynamics of Portfolio Management over the Life Cycle with a Delegation Option 
 Mean Std Median 5%-Q 95%-Q N 
No of Switches 15.16 10.71 9 2 35 2000 
Years of inertia 56.35 15.73 56.00 29.00 78.00 2000 
Years of self-mgmt 5.81 7.90 3.00 0.00 26.00 2000 
Years of delegation 17.84 11.19 17.00 2.00 36.00 2000 
First year change  12.49 10.71 9 2 35 1999 
   First year self-mgmt 45.77 25.04 48.00 12.00 73.00 1561 
   First year delegation 12.46 10.63 9.00 2.00 34.65 1988 
Notes: See Table 2. Also years of delegation refer to the total length of the period of delegated management for 
specific simulated life cycle paths. First year delegation refers to the first year when people change to delegation 
from inertia or from self-management.  
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Table 4: Average Percent Change in Outcomes by Age Group: With and Without a 
Delegation Option 
 
Age Wealth 
Equity 
Share 
Labor 
Income 
Labor 
Supply 
Human 
Capital 
Consump- 
tion 
20~35 21.74 11.05 1.00 0.64 0.04 -0.51 
36~50 23.03 16.20 0.49 0.28 0.08 -0.22 
51~65 23.04 13.04 0.38 -0.20 0.03 2.51 
66+ 25.26 5.57 - - - 2.80 
Notes: The numbers represent the percentage increase summed over the age bin of having access to a delegation 
option versus not having access to a delegation option. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Factors Associated with Portfolio Inertia (versus Self-Management) with No 
Delegation Option: Marginal Effects from Descriptive Logit Analysis 
 
Inertia Chosen (vs Self-Management) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.154***  ‐0.154*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.030***  ‐0.028*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  0.066***  0.067*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
Notes: Each column reports marginal effects from separate Logit regressions. Dependent variable = 1 if the 
individual elected inertia in that period, or 0 = self-management. The observations experiencing inertia total 83.05% 
and self-management 16.95% for 2000 individuals simulated over 80 years. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See text for additional explanation.   
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Table 6: Factors Associated with Portfolio Inertia and Delegation (versus Inertia) with a Delegation 
Option: Marginal Effects from Descriptive Multinomial Logit Analysis  
 
A. Reference Group = Self-Management 
  
Inertia Chosen (vs Self-Management) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.233***  ‐0.233*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.014**  ‐0.013*** 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  0.088***  0.089*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
   Delegation Chosen (vs Self-Management) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  0.186***  0.186*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.006  ‐0.008 
(0.01)  (0.00) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.017***  ‐0.017*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
 
B. Reference Group = Inertia 
   Self-Management Chosen (vs Inertia) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  0.048***  0.047*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  0.020***  0.021*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.071***  ‐0.072*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
   Delegation Chosen (vs Inertia) 
ܹ݈݁ܽݐ݄ሼିଵሽ  0.186***  0.186*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
ܵݐ݋ܿ݇	݉ܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.006  ‐0.008 
(0.01)  (0.00) 
ܹܽ݃݁	ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ሼିଵሽ  ‐0.017***  ‐0.017*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
Notes: Each column reports marginal effects from separate Logit regressions. Dependent variable: = 0 active, 1 if 
inertia, and 2 = delegation. Observations of self-management account for 7.27% of the sample; inertia for 70.44%; 
and 22.29% for delegation respectively, from 2000 individuals simulated over 80 periods of life. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. See text for additional 
explanation. 
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Profiles of Consumption, Earnings, Equity Share, Labor Supply, and 
Human Capital with No Delegation Option 
 
A. Consumption and Wealth    B.Earnings 
 
C. Equity Share      D. Work and Human Capital 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows expected life cycle profiles when only self-management or inertia are feasible, generated 
from 2,000 independent simulations based on optimal feedback controls from the baseline specification of the life 
cycle model (see Table 1). Panel A displays average consumption and wealth paths; Panel B shows average labor 
earnings from work or retirement benefits; Panel C shows the average fraction of wealth invested in equities; and 
Panel D shows average work and human capital profiles.  
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Figure 2: Choice of Portfolio Management Method and Equity Exposure Over the Life 
Cycle: No Delegation Option 
 
A. Life Cycle Portfolio Management Method: No Delegation Option 
 
B. Average Equity Share over Life Cycle Conditional on Portfolio Management Method 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the life cycle pattern of management method and equity share (when no delegation is 
feasible). Panel A illustrates the fraction of investors selecting inertia versus self-management by age. Panel B 
displays the average fraction of financial wealth invested in equities, depending on whether the investor elected 
inertia or self-management. Averages generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals based on 
optimal feedback controls from the baseline specification of the life cycle model (see Table 1). 
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Figure 3: Choice of Portfolio Management Method and Equity Exposure Over the Life Cycle: With 
Delegation Option  
 
A. Life Cycle Portfolio Management Method: With Delegation Option 
 
B Average Equity Share over Life-cycle Conditional on Portfolio Management Method 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the life cycle pattern of management method and equity share when a delegation is 
feasible. Panel A illustrates the fraction of investors selecting inertia, self-management, or delegation by age. Panel B 
displays the average fraction of financial wealth invested in equities, depending on whether the investor elected 
inertia, self-management, or delegation. Averages generated from 2,000 independent simulations for individuals 
based on optimal feedback controls from the baseline specification of the life cycle model (see Table 1). 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Age
Inertia Self‐mgmt Delegation
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Age
Inertia Self‐mgmt Delegation
32 
 
Figure 4: Welfare Gains from Delegation Under Two Efficiency Scenarios 
 
 
Notes: This Figure plots the pattern of welfare gains over the life cycle, if the investor can delegate portfolio 
management for a fee. The solid line indicates welfare gains in the base case, while the dashed line refers to welfare 
gains under reduced financial decisionmaking efficiency(most financially savvy middle-aged with ߶ଶଶ ൌ 0.05 and 
young investors with ߶ଵ ൌ 0.12.) 
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Appendix A. Sufficient Conditions for an Investor to Elect Portfolio Inertia 
 
Let ൫መ݈௧௔, ߨො௧ାଵ௔ , ܿ̂௧௔൯ and ൫መ݈௧௜ , ߨො௧ାଵ௜ ൌ ߨ௧,ܿ̂௧௜൯ be maximizers of the objective functions of a 
self-management method and a portfolio inertia method, respectively. Then the following 
implication holds:  
 
Proposition.  For any	൫ መ݈௧௔, ߨො௧ାଵ௔ , ܿ̂௧௔൯ with	݉ܽݔ൛หመ݈௧௔ െ መ݈௧௜ห, หܿ̂௧௔ െ ܿ̂௧௜หൟ ൏ |ߨො௧ାଵ௔ െ ߨ௧|,there exists 
ߜ∗ ൐ 0 such that	∀ߨො௧ାଵ௔  with	|ߨො௧ାଵ௔ െ ߨ௧| ൏ ߜ∗ implies ௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൐ ௧ܸ௔ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ. 
 
Proof: 
We define the excess value of choosing inertia portfolio over self-management method as:  
 ෨ܸ௧ሺ݈௧, ߨ௧ାଵ, ܥ௧; ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ≡ 	 ௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ െሼܷሺܥ௧, 1 െ ݈௧ െ ߶௧ሻ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሿሽ 
  
The latter part of the equation represents the objective function of self-portfolio management 
method. Then, the excess value function is  
෨ܸ௧ሺଓ௧̂௜ , ߨො௧ାଵ௜ , ܿ̂௧௜; ௧ܹ , ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ ݑ൫ܿ̂௧௜, 1 െ ଓ̂௧௜ ൯ െ ݑሺܿ̂௧௜, 1 െ ߶௧ െ ଓ̂௧௜ ሻ ൐ 0																																											  
because the utility function u is increasing in leisure time. Since ෨ܸ௧ሺ	⋅; ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ   is 
continuous in ሺ݈௧, ߨ௧ାଵ, ܥ௧ሻ , then ∃ߜ ൐ 0 such that ∀	ሺ݈௧, ߨ௧ାଵ, ܥ௧ሻ  with 
݀ൣሺ݈௧, ߨ௧ାଵ, ܥ௧ሻ, ൫መ݈௧௜ , ߨ௧, ܿ̂௧௜൯൧ ൏ ߜ, we have ෨ܸ௧ሺ݈௧, ߨ௧ାଵ, ܥ௧; ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൐ 0. Choose ߜ∗ ൌ ටఋଷ. 
By the assumption that ݉ܽݔ൛หመ݈௧௔ െ መ݈௧௜ ห, หܿ̂௧௔ െ ܿ̂௧௜หൟ ൏ 	 |ߨො௧ାଵ௔ െ ߨ௧|, the condition |ߨො௧ାଵ௔ െ ߨ௧| ൏
ߜ∗ implies:  
ห መ݈௧௔ െ መ݈௧௜ หଶ ൅ |ߨො௧ାଵ௔ െ ߨ௧|ଶ ൅ หܿ̂௧௔ െ ܿ̂௧௜ห ൏ 3ሺߜ∗ሻଶ ൌ ߜ 
 
Thus, ௧ܸ௜ሺ	 ௧ܹ , ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ െ ൛ݑ൫ܿ̂௧௔, 1 െ መ݈௧௔ െ ߶௧൯ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨො௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሿൟ ൐ 0 and the 
latter part is now ௧ܸ௔ሺ	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ because ሺଓ௧̂௔, ߨො௧ାଵ௔ , ܿ̂௧௔ሻ is the solution of self-management 
method. So we showed ௧ܸ௜ ൐ ௧ܸ௔ for all ߨො௧ାଵ௔  with |ߨො௧ାଵ௔ െ ߨ௧| ൏ ߜ∗.  
QED 
 
Discussion: 
If next period’s labor and consumption levels resulting from porfolio self-management are very 
similar to those resulting from inertia, there will be a ‘dominant boundary of portfolio inertia’ 
where inertia will be preferred to self-management. In other words, if an investor expects he will 
end up choosing a similar consumption/labor supply pair next period, a small change in his 
portfolio will be costly without enhancing his discounted lifetime utility. In such a case, it will 
then be optimal for him not to alter his portfolio. 
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Appendix B. Proof of Existence of a Solution 
 
We use backward induction to show the existence of a solution for an investor’s portfolio choice 
problem without a delegation option. The existence of solution for delegation option can be 
similarly proved. Using a discrete choice model, we define the value function as 
 
௧ܸሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ max൛ ௧ܸ௔ሺ	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ, ௧ܸ௜ሺ	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻൟ 
 
for all state vectors ሼሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻሽ௧ୀଵ் . The superscript ܽ denotes the portfolio adjustment and 
i denotes inaction.  
 
The value functions for each decision are defined as  
௧ܸ௔ሺ	 ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ maxሼ஼೟,గ೟శభ,௟೟ሽ ݑ௧ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ 																																																									ݏ. ݐ.		ܥ௧ ൑ 	 ௧ܹ ൅ ݈௧ܪ௧ ௧ܻ 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ݈௧ܪ௧ ௧ܻ െ ܥ௧ሻ 
 
ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻ 
 
݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൅ ߮௧ ൌ 1 ݕ௧ାଵ ൌ ߟ ൅ ߩݕ௧ ൅ ߳௧ାଵ 
 
and for the inactivity case 
  
௧ܸ௜ሺ ௧ܹ, ܪ௧, ߨ௧, ݕ௧ሻ ൌ maxሼ஼೟,௟೟	ሽ ݑ௧ ሺܥ௧, ܮ௧ሻ ൅ ߚܧ௧ሾ ௧ܸାଵሺ ௧ܹାଵ, ܪ௧ାଵ, ߨ௧ାଵ, ݕ௧ାଵሻሿ ݏ. ݐ. ܥ௧ ൑ 	 ௧ܹ ൅ ݈௧ܪ௧ ௧ܻ 
௧ܹାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵ௣ ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ݈௧ܪ௧ ௧ܻ െ ܥ௧ሻ ܪ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߜ௧ሻܪ௧ ൅ ܨ௧ሺܪ௧, ݈௧ሻ ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ 1 ݕ௧ ൌ ߟ ൅ ߩݕ௧ିଵ ൅ ߳௧ 
 
Next we use backward induction:  
1. In the last period ܶ, an investor makes no portfolio decision ሺߨ்ାଵ ൌ ߨ்ሻ and consumes 
all his wealth. 
       			ܥ் ൌ ்ܴ௣ሺ ௧ܹ ൅ ݈௧∗ܪ௧ ௧ܻሻ 
where ݈௧∗ is determined by static optimal decision between ݈௧ and ܮ௧ with ݈௧ ൅ ܮ௧ ൌ1	ሺ߶௧ ൌ 0ሻ. Now, ்ܸ ሺ ்ܹ, ܪ், ߨ், ݕ்ሻ for each state is well defined and we can find 
்ܸ ିଵ௔ ሺ∙ሻ and ்ܸ ିଵ௜ ሺ∙ሻ using their definitions.  
2. With known ்ܸ ିଵ௔ ሺ∙ሻ  and ்ܸ ିଵ௜ ሺ∙ሻ , we can find ்ܸ ିଵሺ∙ሻ as  
்ܸ ିଵሺ∙ሻ ൌ max൛்ܸ ିଵ௔ ሺ∙ሻ, ்ܸ ିଵ௜ ሺ∙ሻൟ 
We know there exists a solution for ்ܸ ିଵ௔  and ்ܸ ିଵ௜  because the constraint sets are 
compact and the objective function is continuous [The Weierstrass Theorem].  
3. Repeat step 1 and 2 until the first period.  
4. After finding the value functions at every period, we can derive policy functions for 
portfolio adjustment decisions each period. 
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Appendix C. Numerical Solution Procedure 
 
Here we describe the procedure for obtaining the numerical solution to the investor’s problem.22 
In the last period of life T, assuming ்ܸ ାଵ ൌ 0 and ்ܽ ൌ 0, the investor maximizes his utility 
over ்ܿ and ்݈ at every pair of state variables ሺ ்ܹ, ܪ், ߨ், ݕ்ሻ. Thus, ்ܸ ሺ ்ܹ, ܪ், ߨ், ݕ்ሻ ൌmax൛௖೅,௟೅ൟ ݑሺܥ், 1 െ ்݈ሻ. This maximization problem is solved by the Nelder-Mead simplex 
method. We approximate ෠்ܸ by the polynomial regression of the maximized value ்ܸ  over the 
pairs of state variable ሺ ்ܹ, ܪ், ߨ், ݕ்ሻ. In period T−1, we calculate ்ܸ ିଵ௜ , ்ܸ ିଵ௔ , ்ܸ ିଵௗ using 
their definitions and the Monte Carlo integration (based on 100 runs) of 
ܧ்ିଵൣ ෠்ܸሺ ்ܹ, ܪ், ߨ், ݕ்ሻ൧, as well as Nelder-Mead optimization over ሺ்݈ିଵ, ߨ், ்ܿሻ. Of course, 
ߨ் ൌ ߨ்ିଵ		in calculating ்ܸ ିଵ௜ .  
 
Then we get ்ܸ ିଵሺ ்ܹିଵ, ܪ்ିଵ, ߨ்ିଵ, ݕ்ିଵሻ ൌ max 	൛்ܸ ିଵ௜ , ்ܸ ିଵ௔ , ்ܸ ିଵௗ ൟ . When ்ܸ ିଵ௜ ൌ
max 	൛்ܸ ିଵ௜ , ்ܸ ିଵ௔ , ்ܸ ିଵௗ ൟ, portfolio inertia is optimal. A different choice of		management method 
is similarly derived. We approximate ෠்ܸିଵ by the polynomial regression of ்ܸ ିଵ		over the pair 
of state variables ሺ ்ܹିଵ, ܪ்ିଵ, ߨ்ିଵ, ݕ்ିଵሻ.  Iterating these steps until the first period, we get 
the approximate value functions ൛ ෠ܸ௧ൟ௧ୀଵ
்
 which completely characterize the solution to the 
investor’s problem. Last, we generate 2,000 sample paths for individual investors using 
variations of the wage shock and uncertain stock market returns 
 
                                                     
22 This numerical procedure is implemented with FORTRAN90 and the GNU Gfortran compiler on the Wharton 
Grid System.  
